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Abstract 
 
A holistic approach to pragmatic ability and disability is outlined which takes account 
both of the behaviour of individuals involved in the communicative process, and also 
of the underlying factors which contribute to such behaviour. Rather than being seen 
as resulting directly from a dysfunction in some kind of discrete pragmatic ‘module’ 
or behavioural mechanism, pragmatic impairment and also normal pragmatic 
functioning are instead viewed as the emergent consequence of interactions between 
linguistic, cognitive and sensorimotor processes which take place both within and 
between individuals. 
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  Introduction 
 
‘Pragmatic impairment’ and cognate terms such as pragmatic impairment/ disability/ 
disorder/ and dysfunction have been used to refer to behaviours found in conditions as 
disparate as aphasia, Asperger’s syndrome, autism, dementia, developmental 
language disorder, Down’s syndrome, focal brain injury, frontal lobe damage, hearing 
impairment, hydrocephalus, learning disability, right hemisphere damage, 
schizophrenia and traumatic brain injury (Perkins, 2003). This might not be a problem 
if the behaviours thus referred to were the same across all of these conditions. 
Unfortunately they are not, and therefore the terms lack discrimination and are hardly 
adequate as diagnostic descriptors. We shall see below that the waters are further 
muddied by inconsistencies in the way the terms are used, and that neurolinguists and 
clinicians have apparently felt the need to embrace a broader semiotic view of 
pragmatics than most pragmatic theorists, although this has gone largely 
unacknowledged. This suggests that the phenomenon of pragmatic disability – and by 
implication pragmatic ability – is not adequately accounted for by at least some 
mainstream pragmatic theories.  
 
What I shall outline in this paper is a holistic and emergentist approach to pragmatics 
which takes account not only of the behaviour of individuals involved in the 
communicative process, but also of the underlying factors which contribute to such 
behaviour1. One motivation for this is to meet the needs of clinicians who require a 
knowledge of the specific underlying factors in order to treat the resulting behaviours. 
But in addition, because clinicians’ needs turn out to be more exacting than those of 
linguists in a number of respects, the provision of such an account can also inform 
pragmatics more generally by focusing attention on features of communicative 
interaction which are not adequately considered by current theories. 
 
 
Dealing with clinical cases forces us to go beyond standard theories of 
pragmatics 
 
                                                 
1 This approach has been developed over a number of years (see, for example, Perkins (1998; 2000; 
2002)) and a much more comprehensive account can be found in Perkins (forthcoming). 
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 Virtually all pragmatics textbooks agree that in broad terms pragmatics should be 
defined as something like ‘(the study of) the use of language’ (e.g. Green, 1989; 
Grundy, 2000; Leech, 1983; Levinson, 1983; Mey, 2001; Thomas, 1995; 
Verschueren, 1999; Yule, 1996). It is rather surprising, therefore, to find that a great 
deal of published work on pragmatic impairment appears to make no such 
assumption. Rather than an exclusive focus on language, it is common instead to find 
non-linguistic features of communication such as eye gaze, gesture, posture and social 
rapport described as ‘pragmatic’ even when they occur independently of language use. 
Dronkers, Ludy and Redfern (1998), for example, assume that pragmatic behaviour is 
isolable and distinct from linguistic behaviour, as is evident from the title of their 
article: ‘Pragmatics in the absence of verbal language’. It would seem that many 
language pathologists, despite acknowledging mainstream pragmatics as their 
information source, at least covertly take a much broader and less exclusively 
language-oriented view than linguists – far closer, in fact, to Morris’s original 
semiotic conception of pragmatics as “the study of the relation of signs to 
interpreters” (Morris, 1938:6). Why should this be so? Firstly, clinicians frequently 
encounter individuals with minimal linguistic capacity – for example, following a 
stroke – who are nonetheless able to communicate quite effectively using 
nonlinguistic and nonverbal means such as body posture, eye gaze and gesture (e.g. 
Goodwin, 2000)2. At the same time, they are equally familiar with the converse 
situation – for example, individuals with autistic spectrum disorder who are unable to 
communicate effectively despite having reasonably good linguistic abilities (e.g. 
Blank, Gessner, & Esposito, 1979). The key factor which differentiates such cases is 
the level of competence in a range of nonlinguistic cognitive capacities such as 
memory, attention and inference generation, and clinicians have thus tended to be far 
more aware than linguists of the role of cognition in pragmatic functioning (Perkins, 
2000). A further motivation for a semiotic view of pragmatics comes from 
neurolinguistics, which suggests that much of what is commonly understood as 
pragmatic competence is controlled by the right cerebral hemisphere, as opposed to 
linguistic competence which is subserved to a much greater extent by the left 
hemisphere (Paradis, 1998). This apparent double dissociation between language and 
pragmatics evident in clinical research suggests that rather than focusing so 
                                                 
2 Indeed, therapy often concentrates on these spared abilities as a means of compensating for linguistic 
disability (Carlomagno, 1994; Davis & Wilcox, 1985). 
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 exclusively on linguistic pragmatics, as linguists and pragmaticians have tended to do 
so far, it might be more fruitful to consider in a more integrated fashion the role of 
nonlinguistic as well as linguistic, and of nonverbal as well as verbal, competencies in 
pragmatic functioning. Thus we might define pragmatics generally as ‘(the study of) 
the use of linguistic and nonlinguistic capacities for the purpose of communication’. 
Some progress in this direction has been made by theories of pragmatics such as 
Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) which emphasizes that language is one 
communication ‘aid’ among many, albeit a uniquely complex and central one. Also, 
the pragmatic significance of the way in which communication may be distributed 
across both verbal and nonverbal modalities has started to be addressed in the 
psychological, sociological and anthropological study of language (Clark, 1996; 
McNeill, 2000) and in the study of language development (Kelly, 2001). What has not 
yet been fully appreciated, though, is the unique insight into the nature of such an 
extended view of pragmatics afforded by the study of communication disorders. 
 
Theoretical constructs and analytical frameworks from a range of approaches to 
pragmatics enable us to describe the behaviour of people with communicative 
impairments reasonably well, and are to some extent equivalent for descriptive 
purposes3. However, although theories of pragmatics provide a means of describing 
pragmatic impairments, the level of explanation they afford is rarely adequate for 
clinicians, in that it does not translate easily into clinical intervention. For example,  
in Transcript 1 the child might be described as breaking Grice’s maxims of relevance, 
quantity (saying more than is required) and possibly manner (‘be brief’), but such 
descriptive labels do not get us very far when trying to design a remedial programme. 
One can hardly tell the child to “stop breaking Grice’s maxims”! 
 
 Transcript 1 
Adult: and what’s in this picture? 
Child: it’s a sheep - on a farm - and my uncle’s farm 
and it has babies - baby lambs 
and tadpoles - frogs have baby tadpoles 
but tadpoles don’t have any legs - do they?  
                                                 
3 See Perkins (2003) for an analysis of a single clinical dataset using five different theoretical 
approaches. 
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 but frogs have legs - and it was in the pond - and mommy 
saw it … 
(from Perkins, 2000) 
 
What is needed in order to move beyond mere description is some account of the 
underlying factors which contribute to pragmatic impairment. As an illustration of 
this, consider Transcripts 2 and 3. 
 
Transcript 2 
Prompt:  the man who sits on the bench next to the oak tree is our mayor. 
Gary:  amen 
 
Transcript 3 
Adult:   can you think of any more? 
Michael:   a remote-controlled cactus 
 
Transcript 2 shows the response of Gary, an 8 year old boy, to a prompt from the 
CELF sentence recall task (Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 1987), where the subject is 
required to repeat the sentence heard. The exchange shown in Transcript 3 is from a 
conversation between Michael, also aged 8, and an adult who has been eliciting 
names for pets. Several have been correctly named immediately prior to this. Gary’s 
and Michael’s responses may be described in similar terms as instances of 
pragmatically anomalous behaviour in that they appear to be irrelevant both in a 
Gricean and Relevance Theory sense. However, the underlying causes in each case 
are quite different. Gary has problems with verbal memory and syntactic 
comprehension. The prompt sentence is both too syntactically complex and too long 
for him to internally represent and retain in short term memory. He focuses instead on 
the final phrase ‘our mayor’ which he mishears and/or misunderstands and repeats as 
‘amen’. Michael, on the other hand, has a diagnosis of autistic spectrum disorder, and 
problems with social cognition make it difficult for him to take proper account of 
prior and surrounding context during conversation. His syntax and verbal memory, in 
contrast to Gary’s, are normal for his age. Clearly, any assessment or intervention 
based solely on a superficial pragmatic description which failed to take account of 
these underlying differences would be less than adequate. What we need in addition is 
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 a means of representing the underlying contributory factors, whether they be 
neurological, cognitive, behavioural or social, and the way in which they interact to 
produce what we perceive as pragmatic ability and disability. One way of doing so is 
to understand how pragmatics may be represented as an ‘emergent’ phenomenon. 
 
 
 Emergence 
 
‘Emergence’ is the term applied to a process whereby a complex entity results from a 
set of simple interactions between ‘lower-level’ entities. For example, anthills result 
from the aggregate effects of millions of local, minor acts by ants, rather than from a 
grand design in the mind of some ant-architect (Johnson, 2001), and the time-telling 
properties of a watch depend on local interactions between a set of individually 
simple cogs and springs. As Clark (1997: 107) puts it: “emergent patterns … are 
largely explained by the collective behavior … of a large ensemble of simple 
components …, none of which is playing a special or leading role in controlling or 
orchestrating the process of pattern formation.” Similarly, minds may be seen as 
“emergent properties of brains … produced by principles that control interactions 
between lower level events” (Chomsky, 2002:63, quoting Mountfield). Emergent 
processes can unfold across a range of time frames including those of evolution, 
embryology, the human lifespan and history, as well as during ephemeral events such 
as online cognitive processing and conversational interaction (MacWhinney, 1999). 
The study of emergence in cognitive science has led to a reappraisal of the 
discreteness and autonomy of a range of phenomena including individuals and the 
human mind. For example, Hutchins (1995) has shown that the cognitive 
characteristics of  teamwork are not attributable to any single individual member of 
the team, and Clark (1999: 14) describes the human cognitive profile as “essentially 
the profile of an embodied and situated organism”.  
 
In the language sciences, emergence has been invoked as a way of explaining a wide 
range of phenomena including language development (Locke, 1993), developmental 
and acquired language disorders (Christman, 2002; Locke, 1994; 1997), the role of 
discourse in determining grammatical form (Hopper, 1998), diachronic language 
change (Givón, 1999) and language evolution (Knight, Studdert-Kennedy, & Hurford, 
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 2000). Although emergence may be modelled particularly effectively using 
connectionist networks (Allen & Seidenberg, 1999) and is often linked to functionalist 
approaches to language (Bates & MacWhinney, 1989), it is also compatible, as noted 
by MacWhinney (1999), with generative approaches to language, which are typically 
opposed to functionalism and connectionism. In his minimalist program for syntax, 
for example, Chomsky regards “the traditional constructions – verb phrase, relative 
clause, passive, etc. – [as] taxonomic artifacts, their properties resulting from the 
interaction of far more general principles” (Chomsky, 1995b:17f.) and feels that “the 
apparent richness and diversity of linguistic phenomena is illusory and 
epiphenomenal, the result of fixed principles under slightly varying conditions” 
(Chomsky, 1995a). To take such a view is not to deny the heuristic value of such 
epiphenomenal constructs for observers in describing behavioural processes,  but it 
does not necessarily follow that such constructs play any direct role for those 
participating in the process. 
 
 
 An emergentist account of pragmatic ability and disability 
 
Far from being seen as emergent, pragmatics has for the most part been viewed 
instead as a distinct entity in its own right, either as a ‘level’ of language or a 
component of the linguistic system on a par with syntax, semantics and phonology. 
Some have gone so far as to characterize pragmatics as a mental ‘module’ in a 
Fodorean sense (Fodor, 1983) – i.e. a distinct and autonomous cognitive system 
which is domain specific, fast, automatic and informationally encapsulated. Kasher 
(1991), for example, argues that knowledge of basic speech act types such as 
assertions and questions and of conversational behaviours such as turn-taking and 
repair is modular; Sperber and Wilson (2002) equate pragmatics with a ‘theory of 
mind’ module which enables us to interpret others’ intentions; and for Paradis (2003) 
the pragmatic module consists of the probablilistic reasoning processes carried out by 
the right cerebral hemisphere.4  
 
                                                 
4 It is interesting that there is so little overlap between these three different views. Whether one sees 
pragmatics as a module or not, the difficulties of definition still remain. 
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 In contrast to the modular approach, the ‘interactionist’ view sees pragmatics as a 
functional or interactional phenomenon (see, for example, discussion in Craig, 1995; 
McTear & Conti-Ramsden, 1992; Penn, 1999). Bates and MacWhinney’s (1982) 
Competition Model sees pragmatics as a function of the interplay between the 
information value of a particular form or pattern and its processing cost. Sperber and 
Wilson in their pre-modularist days were also more amenable to such a view when 
they described pragmatics as “not a cognitive system at all” but “simply the domain in 
which grammar, logic and memory interact” (Wilson & Sperber, 1991: 583). Both of 
these approaches focus on cognitive and linguistic interactions within the individual. 
Clark (1996), on the other hand, feels it is more important to focus on interactions 
between individuals, and regards pragmatics as a function of joint actions between 
people, a view which is also shared by proponents of Conversation Analysis (e.g. 
Schegloff, 1999).  
 
The approach I will propose here is firmly within the interactionist tradition but 
adopts an explicitly emergentist perspective. What I argue is that instead of seeing 
pragmatics as some kind of discrete entity that exists independently of other entities 
with which it interacts (e.g. language, memory, attention etc.), it is better 
characterized as an epiphenomenal or emergent property of interactions between such 
entities. Pragmatics is what you get when entities such as language, social cognition, 
memory, intention and inferential reasoning collide in socio-culturally situated human 
interaction, rather than being instantiated or uniquely grounded in any single one of 
these. The emergentist model below builds on previous interactionist approaches by a) 
extending and being more specific about the range of interacting entities involved and 
the nature of their interaction; b) focusing simultaneously on interactions both within 
and between individuals; and c) providing a single account of both pragmatic ability 
and disability. It is motivated by the following five principles: 
 
1. Pragmatics involves the range of choices open to us when we communicate – for 
example, what is said, how it's said, why it's said, when it's said, where it's said, to 
whom it’s said, who says it and even whether anything is said or not. 
 
2. Such choices are involved at all ‘levels’ of language processing, from discourse 
down to phonetics. 
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3. The choices are not exclusively linguistic, but involve the way communication is 
distributed across verbal and nonverbal channels. 
 
4. In order to qualify as ‘pragmatic’, such choices must be motivated by the 
requirements of interpersonal communication.  
 
5. There is frequently no direct link between an underlying deficit and a resulting 
pragmatic impairment. Rather, the latter may be the consequence of one or more 
compensatory adaptations. 
 
It also involves the following three key notions: 
 
1) Elements. These are the entities between which interactions take place, and are of 
two kinds: a) linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive systems, and b) sensorimotor 
systems. Some examples are shown in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 1: Some cognitive and sensorimotor elements of pragmatics 
 
PRAGMATICS 
Cognitive elements Sensorimotor elements 
Linguistic Nonlinguistic Motor output Sensory input 
 inference   
phonology memory  
prosody attention voice 
auditory 
perception 
morphology social cognition gesture  
syntax theory of mind gaze 
discourse executive function posture 
visual 
perception 
lexis affect   
 conceptual knowledge   
 
                                                 
5 Although identified by a single word or phrase, it should not be assumed that the entities listed are 
necessarily discrete modular systems or processes. It is likely instead that they are all emergent 
phenomena in their own right. 
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 2) Interactions. These are the dynamic relations that occur between elements, and 
are motivated by the need to maintain a state of equilibrium within a given 
domain. 
 
3) Domains. Interactions take place both within individuals – i.e. the intrapersonal 
domain – and between individuals – i.e. the interpersonal domain6.  
 
There is no space here to provide a full account and justification of the model (for 
this, see Perkins, forthcoming), but an illustration of how it may be applied in a 
clinical case should serve to give a flavour. 
 
 
 An illustration 
 
To illustrate the model, I have deliberately chosen a case of communication 
impairment which would not typically be described as involving a primarily 
pragmatic disability, but which nevertheless manifests features which are undeniably 
pragmatic in nature and would therefore need to be accounted for within any 
pragmatic theory or approach which aimed to be comprehensive. We shall see that to 
successfully incorporate such cases within a systematic pragmatic account will require 
a reevaluation of the nature of pragmatic ability and disability. 
 
Lucy is four and a half years old and has a diagnosis of specific language impairment 
(SLI). Although she is of normal intelligence, her phonology and syntax are very 
primitive for her age and she often has problems in making herself understood. In 
conversation, she makes unusual use of gesture in two distinct ways. Firstly, when 
referring to objects and actions she typically accompanies her utterances with iconic 
signs, as in this conversation with Sara, an adult who she knows slightly: 
 
Sara wellies 'd be good for the snow wouldn't they? yeah I agree - 
 anything else? 
                                                 
6 ‘Domain’ is a convenient way of referring to the scope of interactions, and the two mentioned here 
will suffice for present purposes. The situation is rather more complex, though. For example, the 
intrapersonal domain contains various sub-domains – e.g. the cognitive and sensorimotor – and the 
interpersonal domain is itself a sub-domain of the socio-cultural domain. 
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 Lucy [jç - glUb] (your – gloves) [waggles fingers gesturing gloves] 
Sara you'd need gloves for the snow 
Lucy [Qn hQ/] (and . hat)  [gestures pulling on a hat] 
 
This is an extension of the iconic way gesture is sometimes used in conversation, and 
given Lucy’s impaired phonology and grammar, it helps the interlocutor to be surer 
about what Lucy is saying. The second use of gesture is more atypical, and it seems to 
play a role for Lucy rather than the interlocutor. Lucy's speech is mostly syllable-
timed and sounds rather staccato. Sometimes when she is speaking she taps out the 
rhythm of her utterance with her hand, as in: 
 
Sara what would you use a bucket for? 
Lucy p »put . »some»thing . »in . »the . »bu»cket [tapping on the table in 
rhythm with her speech] 
 
This would seem to be of little benefit to the listener, and appears rather to provide for 
Lucy a kind of prosodic and tactile scaffolding for her utterance, distributing it, as it 
were, across two modalities. Sometimes the two different uses of gesture appear to be 
conflated as in: 
 
Sara what's he wearing a bucket on his head for? 
Lucy »bu»cket . »on . »his . »head [taps her head in rhythm with her 
speech] 
 
and here only the iconic component is pragmatic. It is important to note that Lucy has 
not overtly been taught either of these uses of gesture.  
 
Let us now examine the nature of Lucy’s communicative weaknesses and strengths in 
terms of the model outlined above. 
 
Pragmatics as choice 
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 Lucy may be seen as pragmatically impaired by virtue of the fact that the range of 
linguistic choices open to her is more restricted than those enjoyed by her typically 
developing peers. 
 
Pragmatics as choice at all levels of language 
Lucy’s specific restriction lies within the phonological, morphological and syntactic 
elements of her intrapersonal domain, though dysfunction of any linguistic element 
would limit the range of choices available for encoding and decoding meaning. 
 
Pragmatics as choices across modalities 
As shown in Figure 1, we have a wide range of resources to draw on in order to 
communicate including linguistic and nonlinguistic cognitive systems, signalling 
systems such as voice, gesture and eye gaze and perceptual systems such vision and 
audition. Our use of these resources is like a process of orchestration and the way 
meaning is distributed among elements and across domains is the very essence of 
pragmatics. In face to face conversation, for example, we constantly make choices not 
only about what and how much to signal linguistically, but also what and how much 
to encode using other signalling systems such as prosody, gesture, facial expression, 
eye gaze and body posture. Because Lucy’s grammar and phonology are relatively 
primitive, she ‘chooses’ to allocate more resources to the gestural elements of her 
communicative system than you or I would. When she utters the word ‘hat’ – or, to be 
more precise, the phonologically ambigous [hQ/] – she simultaneously produces an 
iconic gesture for hat. These two signals are mutually reinforcing and facilitate 
comprehension. A better developed phonological system would make such a gesture 
unnecessary, and the result of Lucy’s adjustment is therefore perceived as atypical. 
 
Pragmatics as choices motivated by interpersonal communication 
Pragmatic choices are those which are made by human beings because they wish or 
need to communicate with each other, and they involve the use of any resources 
which may help to do the job. To the extent that Lucy’s choice to use iconic gestures 
is made in order to facilitate communication with her interlocutor, it can be described 
as pragmatic. The communicative significance of Lucy’s other use of hand movement 
– i.e. tapping on the table or some other object (e.g. her head) in time with her speech 
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 – is not at all apparent, and at times may even impede the interlocutor’s 
comprehension because it is distracting. It is possible that its motivation is internal to 
Lucy’s intrapersonal domain and helps to trigger the motor programmes involved in 
speech production, although this is only conjecture. However, to the extent that her 
tapping movement is not motivated by the requirements of interpersonal 
communication, it may be seen as not pragmatic7. Another way of putting this is to 
say that intrapersonal choices are only pragmatic when motivated by interpersonal 
considerations. 
 
Pragmatic impairment as compensatory adaptation in both intrapersonal and 
interpersonal domains 
Lucy’s atypical but communicatively helpful use of iconic gesture is a way of 
compensating for a linguistic deficit – i.e. there are interactions between linguistic and 
nonverbal sensorimotor elements in the intrapersonal domain. Communication is 
achieved by redistributing the message load within the overall system. In Lucy’s case 
there is no evidence to suggest that these compensatory adaptations are conscious and 
deliberate – the system, as it were, appears to have readjusted spontaneously. All 
communicative impairments have a pragmatic dimension in that they produce an 
interactional imbalance which results in a redistribution of resources and a 
concomitant reconfiguration of choices motivated by the need for understanding 
between interlocutors. Although we are dealing in each case with the cognitive and 
sensorimotor capacities of an individual, and it makes sense to talk of compensation 
in the intrapersonal domain, in addition there are compensatory interactions between 
individuals. Impairment in a component of an organism can create a state of 
disequilibrium both within the organism itself and between the organism and other 
organisms. The main pressure for reorganization and compensation comes from the 
need to communicate with others – i.e. it is pragmatically motivated. There is also, 
therefore, a state of interpersonal equilibrium to be maintained during the process of 
communication. For example, when trying to make sense of what is said by someone 
with severe linguistic impairment we may draw more extensively than usual on 
nonlinguistic resources such as inference and visual perception. When faced, on the 
other hand, with nonlinguistic impairments such as autism or blindness we are more 
                                                 
7 If this is so, it would also be inaccurate to describe it as a ‘gesture’, which also implies 
communicative intent. 
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 likely to compensate by putting extra effort into making our meaning more 
linguistically explicit. Although there may be no specific intention to co-opt the 
communicative resources of an interlocutor, nor indeed any conscious intention on the 
part of the interlocutor to respond, the pressure for homeostasis through compensation 
is extremely powerful. The overriding pressure for equilibrium in the interpersonal 
domain is the key pragmatic driver. It does not matter where the original deficit 
occurs, or how it is compensated for. The deficit may be linguistic, cognitive, motor 
or perceptual, and compensation may be attempted by making adjustments to a 
similar or quite different element, or to a number of such elements simultaneously 
either serially or in parallel. Because of this, there may be no apparent link between 
an underlying deficit and a resulting pragmatic impairment. Rather, the latter may be 
the consequence of one or more compensations. Indeed, compensatory adaptations 
may give rise to symptoms which may appear to be distinct impairments in their own 
right but are in fact merely an attempted solution to an underlying problem (see, for 
example, Perkins, 2001). 
 
The scope of pragmatic impairment 
How much should be included in pragmatics? Conventional accounts would say that 
Lucy’s communicative problems are linguistic and that her pragmatic abilities are 
intact. Certainly, the underlying deficits which give rise to Lucy’s atypical 
communication have little in common with the types of cognitive deficit commonly 
purported to contribute to a condition such as autism (impaired theory of mind, 
executive function or central coherence) which is seen as a more prototypical example 
of pragmatic impairment. And yet, there is also a clear sense in which Lucy’s 
pragmatic behaviour is atypical in that her inadequate linguistic formulations make 
conversational interaction laboured and problematic. How is it possible to be 
pragmatically competent and incompetent at the same time? We may begin to resolve 
this conundrum firstly by identifying and distinguishing between the various 
cognitive, linguistic and sensorimotor factors which underly communicative 
performance (McTear & Conti-Ramsden, 1992; Perkins, 2000). In Lucy’s case the 
underlying problem appears to be linguistic, though the consequences are no less 
pragmatic in terms of restricted communicative choice than would be the case for 
underlying cognitive and sensorimotor problems. Rather than being similar in kind to 
language, cognition and sensorimotor processes, pragmatics is instead an inescapable 
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 and inalienable consequence of processing in all these areas – i.e. it is emergent. As 
Schegloff (2003: 26-27) puts it with reference to linguistic communication: “If the 
pragmatics is separated from ‘the rest’, can the rest issue in recognizable, coherent, 
and effective linguistic products? If there are such products, can the pragmatics 
possibly be cut off from the rest of the speech production process?” The apparent 
contradiction of Lucy being pragmatically competent and incompetent at the same 
time is simply a problem with more conventional definitions of pragmatics. Lucy’s 
linguistic problems place an extra inferential burden on her interlocutor, but her 
unimpaired cognitive and sensorimotor abilities mean she is able to appreciate her 
interlocutor’s communicative needs and make subtle adjustments to (partially) 
accommodate them. A similar point has been made by Schegloff (2003) in a case 
study of a ‘split-brain’ patient who, despite having been diagnosed as pragmatically 
impaired according to a range of psychometric tests, was nevertheless able to 
demonstrate remarkable sensitivity to various interpersonal requirements of the 
testing situation. Emergentist pragmatics enables us to capture such insights without 
falling into contradiction. It enables us to take a broad and yet coherent view of 
pragmatics while at the same time not losing sight of the subtlety and range of its 
various manifestations.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Pragmatic competence is not a unitary phenomenon. It requires the integration of a 
range of linguistic, cognitive, sensorimotor and sociocultural elements, and 
impairment of any of these can result in pragmatic disability. This view of pragmatics 
is radically different to most other accounts to be found in the language pathology 
literature where the term 'pragmatic disability' is most commonly restricted to 
behaviours resulting from the type of socio-cognitive impairment found in autism, 
right hemisphere brain damage and traumatic brain injury. I have proposed that 
pragmatic impairment results when there is a restriction on the choices available for 
encoding or decoding meaning, whatever they might be. These choices are 
characterised in terms of a range of capacities which underlie communicative 
behaviour. The emergentist model outlined here accounts for pragmatic disability in 
terms of an imbalance between interacting linguistic, cognitive and sensorimotor 
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 systems within and between individuals, and also in terms of attempts to compensate 
for both linguistic and non-linguistic impairment. Motivation for redressing the 
balance is interpersonal though it will inevitably have local intrapersonal 
consequences. Pragmatics is therefore not a discrete and isolable component of our 
communication – it is all-pervasive. 
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